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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X
:
MANDELA BROCK,
:
:
Plaintiff,
:
:
-v:
:
MARK ZUCKERBERG, et al.,
:
:
Defendants.
:
:
---------------------------------------------------------------------- X

6/25/2021

20-cv-7513 (LJL)
OPINION AND ORDER

LEWIS J. LIMAN, United States District Judge:
Pro se Plaintiff Mandela Brock (“Plaintiff” or “Brock”) filed this action on September 14,
2020 against Facebook, Inc. (“Facebook”), Mark Zuckerberg (“Zuckerberg”), Sheryl Sandberg
(“Sandberg”), and John and Jane Does 1-100 (collectively, “Defendants”). By amended
complaint, Plaintiff added Sean Parker (“Parker”) and Mark Pincus (“Pincus”) as Defendants.
Plaintiff claims Defendants violated his constitutional rights to free speech and due process by
allegedly removing and blocking his Facebook posts. Plaintiff also alleges a series of civil
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) violations.
Defendants move to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) and 12(b)(6)
on the grounds that Plaintiff’s complaint fails to state a claim for relief. Alternatively,
Defendants move to transfer the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District
of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).
For the following reasons, the Court grants the motion to dismiss with prejudice. It also
denies the motion to transfer as moot.
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Mandela Brock brought this action against Facebook, Zuckerberg, Sandberg and
later Parker for “unconstitutionally censor[ing]” his content on the Facebook platform.1 Dkt. No.
2 (“Compl.”) ¶ 4.
Facebook is a California-based technology company that operates a variety of online
services and applications, including its flagship “Facebook” social media platform. Dkt. No. 29
at 12. Mark Zuckerberg serves as Chief Executive Officer of Facebook and Sheryl Sandberg
serves as Chief Operating Officer.2 Id. On the Facebook platform, individuals can upload
content, share posts, create groups, and comment on other posts. See Compl., Ex. A-1, A-2.
According to Defendants, all persons who use Facebook must agree to Facebook’s User
Agreement. Dkt. No. 28 at 1 (the “Agreement”). The Agreement includes Facebook’s “Terms
of Use,” “Statement of Rights and Responsibilities,” and “Terms of Service.” Id. Facebook’s
Terms of Service, Dkt. No. 18-1, prohibit users from “shar[ing] anything: [t]hat violates . . . our
Community Standards . . . [t]hat is unlawful, misleading, discriminatory or fraudulent.” Dkt. No.
18-1 at 4. Plaintiff is registered to use Facebook under the username “Mandela El’Shabazz.”
Compl., Ex. A.3
Plaintiff claims Facebook “censored” his content on its platform at least thirty times
between March 2020 and September 2020. Dkt. No. 21 (“Amended Complaint” or “AC”) ¶ 4.
He alleges that Facebook first “censored” his posts on or around March 15, 2020 and that
Facebook’s removal of his posts “intensified” following the George Floyd protests in May 2020.
Zuckerberg, Sandberg, and Parker are referred to as the “Individual Defendants.”
While Parker was named as a Defendant in the Amended Complaint, no summons has been
issued against him.
3
The Plaintiff did not include all relevant claims or Exhibits A, C, D, F, K or M in the Amended
Complaint. However, in accordance with the Court’s obligation to construe pro se pleadings
liberally, the Court considers both the original complaint and the amended complaint together.
1
2

2
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Id. ¶ 5. Plaintiff’s posts were flagged and removed by Facebook for violating the company’s
“Community Standards” on spam, Compl., Exs. A, C, and F, and its “Community Standards” on
hate speech, Compl., Exs. A, C, D, K, and M. Plaintiff’s posts were also flagged for being
“abusive,” Compl., Ex. L, and for being “partly false,” Compl., Exs. R and Q.
In response to Facebook’s removal and flagging of his content, Plaintiff alleges violations
of his constitutional rights under the First, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. Compl.
¶¶ 16-20, 21-26; AC ¶¶ 23-27, 28-33. Plaintiff claims Facebook, Zuckerberg, and Sandberg
violated Plaintiff’s “right to free speech” by allowing the “Facebook Oversight Board,”4 which
he presumes is responsible for ensuring user compliance with Facebook’s Community Standards,
to “censor” his content. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18; AC ¶¶ 24-25. Plaintiff then alleges Defendants
violated his “due process” rights by failing to provide him with an opportunity to “put forward a
stated . . . defense” for his posts. Compl. ¶ 17; AC ¶ 24. Plaintiff also claims that Zuckerberg,
Sandberg, and Parker “permitted, tolerated, and w[ere] deliberately indifferent to a clear pattern
of suppression of free speech, discrimination, and partisanship abuse.” Compl. ¶ 22; AC ¶ 29.
Plaintiff also alleges Facebook and the Individual Defendants violated RICO. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962; AC ¶¶ 34-71. Plaintiff’s RICO claims primarily relate to Defendants’ motion to transfer
the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, pursuant to the
forum selection clause in Facebook’s Terms of Service. AC ¶¶ 20-22. Plaintiff alleges
Defendants—in seeking to enforce the forum selection clause—are operating a “jurisdictional
shell game.” Id. ¶ 11.

4

Plaintiff defines the Facebook Oversight Board in the Amended Complaint John Doe 1-100 and
Jane Doe 1-100.
3

Case 1:20-cv-07513-LJL Document 37 Filed 06/25/21 Page 4 of 13

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On September 14, 2020, Plaintiff filed an initial complaint against Facebook, Zuckerberg,
Sandberg, and John Doe 1-100 and Jane Doe 1-100.5 Compl. at 3. Defendants moved to dismiss
the initial complaint, or alternatively to transfer venue to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) on November 20, 2020. Dkt. No.
17.
Plaintiff filed the Amended Complaint on December 16, 2020. Pursuant to the Court’s
individual practices, Defendants’ motion to dismiss was denied as moot. Dkt. No. 26. In the
Amended Complaint, Plaintiff added Defendants Parker (in his personal and corporate
capacities) and Pincus. Pincus is the litigation attorney who appeared for Facebook, Zuckerberg,
and Sandberg in this case. Id. On December 30, 2020, the Court dismissed the claims against
Pincus as frivolous. Dkt. No. 26. Plaintiff appealed the Court’s decision to dismiss the claims
against Pincus. Dkt. No. 30. The Second Circuit dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1291 on June 3, 2021. Dkt. No. 36. Pincus, on behalf of Zuckerberg, Sandberg, and
Facebook, filed a new motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, or alternatively, to transfer
venue on January 11, 2021. Dkt. No. 29. Plaintiff responded to the motion to dismiss on
February 28, 2021. Dkt. No. 30. On March 8, 2021, Defendants filed a reply memorandum of
law in further support of their motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 34.
LEGAL STANDARD
In considering a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), a court must “accept the
material facts as alleged in the complaint as true and construe all reasonable inferences in the
plaintiff’s favor.” Phelps v. Kapnolas, 308 F.3d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting Hernandez v.

5

Plaintiff does not make any substantive allegations against John Doe 1-100 or Jane Doe 1-100.
4
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Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133, 136 (2d Cir. 1994)). However, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Court is obligated to construe pro se pleadings
broadly and liberally, interpreting them so as to raise the strongest arguments they suggest. See
Abbas v. Dixon, 480 F.3d 636, 639 (2d Cir. 2007); Cruz v. Gomez, 202 F.3d 593, 597 (2d Cir.
2000).
However, while the Court construes pro se pleadings liberally, this does not relieve pro se
plaintiffs of the requirement that they plead enough facts to “nudg[e] their claims across the line
from conceivable to plausible.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Nor does it relieve them of the
obligation to otherwise comply with the pleading standards set forth by the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. See Saidin v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 498 F. Supp. 2d 683, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2007);
see also Locicero v. O’Connell, 419 F. Supp. 2d 521, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (requiring that pro se
litigants allege sufficient facts to indicate deprivation of a constitutional right).
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff alleges Facebook’s removal and blocking of his posts violated both his
constitutional rights and various “New York State” claims. AC ¶¶ 23-27, 28-33; Dkt. No. 33
¶¶ 28-29. The Court construes the Complaint as primarily alleging claims under the Free Speech
Clause of the First Amendment and the Communications Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230.
Plaintiff also alleges Defendants’ motion to transfer constituted “racketeering activity” and
violated several federal statutes. AC ¶¶ 34-71. The Court addresses these claims in turn.

5
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I.

Claims Related to Alleged Removal of Content
A.

Claims Under the First Amendment
Claims Against Facebook

“Because the United States Constitution regulates only the Government, not private
parties, a litigant claiming that his constitutional rights have been violated must first establish
that the challenged conduct constitutes state action.” Fabrikant v. French, 691 F.3d 193, 206 (2d
Cir. 2012) (quoting Flagg v. Yonkers Sav. & Loan Ass' n, 396 F.3d 178, 186 (2d Cir. 2005)); see
also Hudgens v. N.L.R.B., 424 U.S. 507, 513 (1976) (“[T]he constitutional guarantee of free
speech is a guarantee only against abridgment by government.”); Rodriguez v. Winski, 973 F.
Supp. 2d 411, 419 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“It is axiomatic that the First Amendment protects the rights
to speak, publish, and assemble against abridgement only by the government.”).
The actions of a private corporation only constitute state action “(i) when the private
entity performs a traditional, exclusive public function; (ii) when the government compels the
private entity to take a particular action or (iii) when the government acts jointly with the private
entity.” Manhattan Cmty. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019) (internal
quotations and citations omitted). Notably, “merely hosting speech by others is not a traditional,
exclusive public function and does not alone transform private entities into state actors subject to
First Amendment constraints.” Id. at 1930. Therefore, private companies which maintain public
online forums may “exercise editorial discretion over the speech and speakers in [such]
forum[s].” Id.
Though the Second Circuit has not addressed the question of whether a social media
provider is a state actor for First Amendment purposes, other circuits that have confronted the
issue have unanimously held platforms like Facebook are not state actors. For example, the D.C.
Circuit recently held that Facebook, Google, Twitter, and Apple were not state actors; the court

6
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then affirmed the dismissal of First Amendment claims against the companies. Freedom Watch,
Inc. v. Google Inc., 816 F. App’x 497, 499 (D.C. Cir. 2020) (noting the mere provision of “an
important forum for speech” did not transform online platforms into state actors). In a similar
case involving YouTube, the Ninth Circuit held that “the state action doctrine preclude[d]
constitutional scrutiny of YouTube’s content moderation pursuant to its Terms of Service and
Community Guidelines.” Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020).
Other courts throughout the country have also declined to treat Facebook as a state actor and
have upheld the company’s ability to remove content. See, e.g., Ebeid v. Facebook, Inc., 2019
WL 2059662 at *6 (N.D. Cal. May 9, 2019); Zimmerman v. Facebook, Inc., 2020 WL 5877863
at *2 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 2, 2020).
Plaintiff’s claims based on the First Amendment, as well as on the Fifth, Sixth, and
Fourteenth Amendments, therefore fail at the threshold because Facebook is not a state actor.
Plaintiff contends that Facebook’s status as a “state actor” is “immaterial” because Facebook is
performing a function “traditionally” performed by the government. Dkt. No. 33 ¶¶ 8-12. The
relevant function that Facebook provides is an online platform for speech. Plaintiff also
analogizes Facebook’s provision of an online messaging service to the government’s traditional
provision of mail services through the United States Postal Service. Id. ¶¶ 10-11. However, “[i]t
is ‘not enough’ that the relevant function is something that a government has ‘exercised . . . in
the past, or still does’ or ‘that the function serves the public good.’” Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at
998 (quoting Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928-29). The government must have performed the
function in question exclusively as well. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1929. Facilitating the exchange
of communication or hosting a platform for discussion are not activities “that only governmental
entities have traditionally performed.” Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 998 (quoting Halleck, 139 S.
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Ct. at 1930). Thus, Plaintiff may not “avoid the state action question” by claiming that Facebook
is serving a public function. Id. at 999.
Plaintiff’s other arguments regarding Facebook’s status as a “new town square,” Dkt. No.
33 ¶ 12, have been similarly addressed and dismissed by other courts. See e.g., Zimmerman,
2020 WL 5877863, at *2 (holding the operation of a “digital town square” did not make
Facebook a state actor). The Supreme Court held in Marsh v. State of Alabama, 326 U.S. 501,
506 (1946) that citizens in a company-owned town were guaranteed constitutional protections
against the deprivation of their First Amendment rights by the company, but courts have refused
to extend Marsh’s holding to social media cases. See, e.g., Prager Univ., 951 F.3d at 998
(noting Marsh was “unequivocally confined . . . to the unique and rare context of company
town[s] and other situations where the private actor perform[s] the full spectrum of municipal
powers”) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Finally, Facebook’s status as a
publicly held company does not make the company a state actor for the purposes of
constitutional violations. See Freedom Watch, 816 F. App’x at 499 (dismissing First
Amendment claims against Google, Facebook, Twitter, and Apple, which are all publicly traded
companies).
Claims Against Individual Defendants
Plaintiff has not pleaded sufficient facts about Zuckerberg or Sandberg’s personal
involvement which would “nudg[e] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.”
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. Plaintiff claims that the Individual Defendants “permitted, tolerated,
and [sic] were deliberately indifferent to a clear pattern of suppression of free speech,
discrimination, and partisanship abuse.” Compl. at 6. However, Plaintiff fails to allege any facts
that connect Zuckerberg or Sandberg to Facebook’s removal of his posts. In the absence of any

8
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allegations connecting Zuckerberg or Sandberg to Plaintiff’s claims, the Amended Complaint
must be dismissed.
B.

Claims Under the Communications Decency Act
Claims Against Facebook

The Court construes Plaintiff’s unspecified “New York State” claims as primarily
alleging violations of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”). Under Section
230(c)(1) of the CDA, “[n]o provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated
as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content
provider.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). The aim of Section 230(c)(1) is to “provide immunity for
‘interactive computer service[s]’ that make ‘good faith’ efforts to block and screen offensive
content.” Fed. Trade Comm’n v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016). “In
light of Congress’s objectives, the Circuits are in general agreement that the text of Section
230(c)(1) should be construed broadly in favor of immunity.” Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d
53, 64 (2d Cir. 2019).
A defendant will not be liable for removing certain content if it is “(1) a provider or user
of an interactive computer service, (2) the claim is based on information provided by another
information content provider and (3) the claim would treat [the defendant] as the publisher or
speaker of that information.” LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 173 (quoting Universal Commc’n
Sys., Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d 413, 418 (1st Cir. 2007)).
Plaintiff’s allegations fail to make out a claim against Facebook under Section 230(c)(1).
First, Facebook’s online platform has routinely been classified as an “interactive computer
service.” Cohen v. Facebook, Inc., 252 F. Supp. 3d 140, 156 n.10 (E.D.N.Y. 2017); see also, id.
(“The Second Circuit has not considered whether social media platforms in particular are
‘interactive computer services’ within the meaning of the law; however, other courts have readily
9
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concluded that such websites (and Facebook in particular) fall into this category.”). Second,
Plaintiff does not allege that Facebook or the Individual Defendants “provided” the information
that led to the claim. Rather, Plaintiff’s claims are based on Facebook’s alleged removal of
content he personally created or shared. Compl. ¶¶ 17-18; AC ¶¶ 24-25; see LeadClick Media,
LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 174 (2d Cir. 2016) (emphasizing a defendant “will not be held responsible
unless it assisted in the development of what made the content unlawful”). Third, Section
230(c)(1) “bars lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher's
traditional editorial functions—such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter
content.” Id.; see also Domen v. Vimeo, Inc., 433 F. Supp. 3d 592, 601 (S.D.N.Y. 2020)
(upholding Vimeo’s immunity under Section 230(c)(1) to filter or remove content which violated
its content and community policies). Facebook is therefore immune under Section 230(c)(1)
from claims related to its removal of objectionable content.
Claims Against Individual Defendants
Plaintiff also claims that Zuckerberg, in his individual capacity, cannot claim immunity
under Section 230(c)(1) because he is “responsible for hiring the ‘Fact Checking Service’ that
checks the veracity of reposts and then publishes the ‘corrected’ content.” Dkt. No. 33 ¶¶ 26-27.
Presumably, Plaintiff is asserting that Zuckerberg is in some way an “information content
provider” and thus not immune from liability. Similarly, Plaintiff claims Sandberg is not
immune under Section 230(c)(1) because she is “the ‘direct manger’ of the ‘content’ that is fact
checked and then published with the correction.” Id. ¶ 29. However, here again Plaintiff fails to
plead facts which support a “plausible” connection between the Individual Defendants and
Facebook’s alleged removal of his content. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.

10
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II.

Claims Related to RICO Violations
Plaintiff’s Amended Complaint alleges Defendants violated the following federal

statutes, which may serve as predicate RICO offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1): 18 U.S.C.
§ 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (relating to the obstruction of state or local law
enforcement), and 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, robbery, or
extortion). AC ¶¶ 34-43, 54-63, 64-67. In his opposition to the motion to dismiss, Plaintiff also
alleged violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (relating to wire fraud) and 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a) (relating
to obstruction of justice). Dkt. No. 33 ¶¶ 37-47; 40. Though not defined as “racketeering
activity” under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1), Plaintiff also alleges violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (fraud
and related activity in connection with access devices) and general violations of 18 U.S.C. §
1962(a). AC ¶¶ 50-53, 68-71.
“To establish a RICO claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) a violation of the RICO statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1962; (2) an injury to business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the
violation of Section 1962.” Cruz v. FXDirectDealer, LLC, 720 F.3d 115, 120 (2d Cir. 2013)
(quoting DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 305 (2d Cir. 2001)). To demonstrate a violation of
the RICO statute, a plaintiff must show “(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern
(4) of racketeering activity.” Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 496 (1985). Predicate
offenses which constitute “racketeering activity” are listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). “A ‘pattern
of racketeering activity’ is defined by the statute as ‘at least two acts of racketeering activity’
within a ten-year period.” Kim v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 1691(5)).
“Litigation activity alone cannot constitute a viable RICO predicate act.” Id. at 105. The
majority of Plaintiff’s RICO claims stems from Defendants’ efforts to enforce Facebook’s forum
selection clause. See e.g., AC ¶ 38 (alleging Defendants are “attempting to ‘defraud’ the court
11
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by ‘swindling’ the court . . . into transferring this matter to a venue that is not proper”); id. ¶ 55
(claiming Defendants are “obfuscating justice” by organizing under the laws of one state and
conducting business in other states); id. ¶ 65 (contending Defendants are engaged in a
“duplicitous playing of the jurisdictional shell game”). Plaintiff’s claims, which stem from the
Defendants’ motion to transfer the action pursuant to Facebook’s Terms of Service, must fail
because they arise purely out of a litigation action. See Kim, 884 F.3d at 105. Thus, the
following claims, which the Court construes as based primarily on Facebook’s motion to transfer
the action, must fail: 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (relating to mail fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (relating to the
obstruction of State or local law enforcement), 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (relating to interference with
commerce, robbery, or extortion), 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (relating to wire fraud), 18 U.S.C. § 1503(a)
(relating to obstruction of justice), and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a).
Finally, Plaintiff’s claims alleging violations of 18 U.S.C. § 1029 (fraud and related
activity in connection with access devices) fail as a matter of law as Plaintiff did not allege any
facts which suggest Facebook used “access devices” in an unauthorized manner. 18 U.S.C.
§ 1029(e)(1).

12
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CONCLUSION
Defendants’ motion, in the alternative, to transfer the venue to the United States District
Court for the Northern District of California under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) is DENIED as such a
transfer would not be necessary or a beneficial use of judicial resources.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss the Amended Complaint is GRANTED in accordance
with this opinion and order.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to close Dkt. No. 27 and to close the case.
SO ORDERED.

Dated: June 25, 2021
New York, New York

__________________________________
LEWIS J. LIMAN
United States District Judge
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